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CONSENT TO PERSONAL DATA PROCESSING – 
THE PANACEA OR THE DEAD END?
by
JAKUB MÍŠEK* **
The paper deals with the question of proper use of consent to personal data pro-
cessing on the Internet. Legal requirements of such consent are discussed in the  
first part of the paper, when Directive 95/46/EC, Directive 2002/58/EC as well as  
their Czech implementation, Act No. 101/2000 Coll., on the Protection of Personal  
Data and Act No. 127/2005 Coll., on the electronic communications are examined.  
The second part of the paper questions capability of data subjects to make an in-
formed consent and adequacy of this legal institute. The second part also points out  
a common problem of its wrong use which is a practice of data controllers, who try  
to legitimise data processing by consent even in situations, when it is not a proper  
way of doing so. Finally, a possible solution to the presented problem is discussed.
KEYWORDS
Personal  Data  Protection,  Consent  to  Processing,  Consent  Fetishism,  Informed  
Consent
1. INTRODUCTION
The European legal regulation of personal data protection is based on the 
principle of a strong legal protection, which can be breached only by certain 
legal means. This can be seen in article 7 of the European Directive 95/46/EC 
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal 
data (further  referred as  “Data protection  directive”),  which  is  key legal 
document for the whole European data protection framework. It states that 
the Member States shall allow the processing of personal data only if certain 
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criteria are met. Consent of the data subject, by which she agrees with per-
sonal data processing, is such a criterion and it seems that for many, both le-
gislator and data controllers, the most important one.
Consent to data processing was included in Commission’s proposal of 
the Data protection directive from 1990 as one of the possibilities how to le-
gitimise data processing. It is one of the key parts of the directive as can be 
seen from the text of the proposal itself: “The data subject's consent to the pro-
cessing of data relating to him is an important justification for the processing of  
personal data by the controller of the file.”1 Furthermore, a role of consent as a 
legal base for data processing is expressly acknowledged in the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union.2 Article 8, which introduces the 
Right to the protection of personal data, states in paragraph 2: “[Personal]  
data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent  
of  the  person concerned or  some other  legitimate  basis  laid down by  law.” Al-
though the provision speaks about an existence of some other legitimate 
basis, consent is the only one explicitly named. Finally, the importance of 
the consent can be seen from a common daily experience, when everyone is 
a subject of consenting many times a week. Common tasks like registration 
to on-line services, approving of cookies, on-line commerce and many oth-
ers might serve as an example. 
Consent in data protection law is a way of expression of an individual’s 
opinion whether and under what conditions the other party can process her 
personal  data.3 This  legal  instrument  therefore  can,  and  in  my  opinion 
should, serve as a tool by which can be achieved what Daniel J. Solove calls 
a “Privacy self-management”.4 This is a complex approach to personal pri-
vacy applicable by everyone, which allows an individual to control her per-
sonal data, weigh the price and benefits of data disclosure and decide when 
and to whom allow data processing.
The purpose of this article is to question whether the current approach of 
both legislator and data controllers to consent is still up to date with today’s 
1 Proposal for  a Directive  concerning the protection of individuals  in  relation to the pro-
cessing of personal data, COM (90),  314 final,  SYN 287 and 288, Brussels,  13 September 
1990. p. 26.
2 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000/C 364/01.
3 Of course this applies only in the case when no other legal bases for data processing are ap -
plicable.
4 Solove, D. L. 2013, 'Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemmas', Harvard Law Re-
view, vol. 126, no. 7, pp. 1880-1903. Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract_id=2171018 [cited 15th Jan. 2014].
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massive use of the Internet and other electronic means of data processing, 
or whether it has flaws which need to be fixed. In the first part I present leg-
al requirements of a valid consent to personal data processing. The second 
part  of  the  paper  questions  capability  of  data  subjects  to  deliver  an  in-
formed consent and adequacy of this legal institute. The second part also 
points out a common problem of its wrong use, which is caused by practice 
of data controllers who try to legitimise data processing by consent even in 
situations, when it is not a proper time to do so. Finally a possible solution 
to the presented problem is discussed.
2. THE EUROPEAN LEGAL REGULATION OF THE CONSENT 
TO PERSONAL DATA PROCESSING
The first step on our journey is a proper analysis of consent to personal data 
processing in black-letter law. Data protection directive defines the consent 
in the Article 2 letter h) as “any freely given specific and informed indication of  
[data subject’s] wishes by which the data subject signifies his agreement to personal  
data relating to him being processed”. Article 7 states that data processing shall 
be lawful only if certain requirements are met. First listed in the list of re-
quirements, marked by letter a), is an unambiguous consent given by the 
data subject. Other basis for legal data processing include for example the 
necessity of processing for the performance of a contract to which the data 
subject is party (letter b)); the necessity of processing for compliance with a 
legal obligation to which the controller is subject (letter c)) and the necessity 
of processing for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest  
or in the exercise of official authority (letter e)). Furthermore, in case that 
the “sensitive personal data”, which are enumerated in Article 8 paragraph 
15, are part of the processing, an explicit consent to the processing is neces-
sary.
Two important findings are arising from the previous paragraph. First, 
in order to be valid, the consent must be cumulatively: 1) freely given; 2) 
specific; 3) informed and 4) unambiguous. Second, consent is not the only 
way how the data controller can achieve legality of its processing. As Work-
ing Party 296 (further referred as WP29) states, “the order in which the legal  
grounds are cited under Article 7 is relevant, but it does not mean that consent is  
5 E.G. data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical be-
liefs, health or sex life.
6 Working Party 29 is an independent European advisory body on data protection and pri-
vacy, which was set up under Article 29 of Data protection directive.
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always the most appropriate ground to legitimise the processing of personal data .”7 
This will be further discussed in the chapters 3 and 4 of this paper.
Aside from Data protection directive is Directive 2002/58/EC, on privacy 
and electronic communications also important for data protection in on-line 
environment. Article 5 (3), which was amended by Directive 2009/136/EC 
specifies legal requirements for the use of cookies and other similar techno-
logies carried out by electronic communication networks in order to store 
information or to gain access to information stored in the terminal equip-
ment of a user.8 In the original version of the provision this was allowed un-
der the condition, that the user was informed by the data controller about 
the processing in accordance with Data protection directive and was offered 
to refuse such processing. In other words, it was a nice example of an opt-
out principle. Directive 2009/136/EC, along with the introduction of a more 
restrictive exemption from the rule, changed the opt-out into an opt-in prin-
ciple with this wording: “storing of information or the gaining of access to in-
formation already stored, in the terminal equipment of a subscriber or user is only  
allowed on condition that the subscriber or user concerned has given his or her con-
sent...”9 Since the art. 1(2) of the Electronic communication directive states 
that provisions of this directive particularise and complement Data protec-
tion directive, this has to be interpreted in a way, that the user of cookies  
and  similar  technologies  has  to  give  consent  fulfilling  all  requirements 
defined by Data protection directive.
2.1 ANALYSIS OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR A VALID 
CONSENT
According to WP29 the consent is freely given, if the data subject has a real  
choice and “there is no risk of deception, intimidation, coercion or significant neg-
ative consequences if he/she does not consent.”10 If there is not a real choice and 
for some reason the data subject has to consent, this consent cannot be seen 
as a valid one. For instance, if a data subject has a legal duty to grant her 
data for processing it cannot be done on the bases of consent because there 
7 WP29 Opinion No. 15/2011 on the definition of consent, from 13 th July 2011. 01197/11/EN. 
WP187. P. 7.
8 In the scope of this provision are for example also mobile applications or software distrib -
uted on-line via services like iTunes or Steam.
9 Directive  2002/58/EC, on privacy and electronic  communications,  amended by Directive 
2009/136/EC. Art. 5(3).
10 WP29 Opinion No. 15/2011 on the definition of consent, from 13 th July 2011. 01197/11/EN. 
WP187. P. 12.
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is not a free will included. One such case is a creation of a bank account. The 
bank has legal duty to process certain data about the customer. In this case 
the useable legal ground for processing is therefore compliance with a legal 
obligation to which the controller is subject. Another example might be a re-
gistration to a social network service, e.g. Facebook. This time the consent is 
a  valid  ground for  data  processing,  because  the  data  subject  has  a  real 
choice not to use the service. Even though the service might have a huge 
market  share  and  the  data  subject  can  experience  some  negative  con-
sequences of not being a part of it, it hardly can be described as significant  
negative consequences.
To be “specific” the consent should be intelligible. As WP29 states, “it  
should refer clearly and precisely to the scope and the consequences of the data pro-
cessing.”11 The data subject must therefore be well informed about the de-
tails of the processing, what is the purpose of the processing, how her per-
sonal  data will  be used,  who will  have access  to  it  and other  important 
questions. Blanket consent cannot be valid. As we can see, there is a very 
narrow link between this condition and the purpose limitation principle. 
For example, a user of a mobile application for reviewing visited restaurants 
consents to the processing of her personal data in regard of using her geo-
location  to show nearby restaurants  with  certain  number  of  positive  re-
views. If the data controller, in this case a company running the application, 
would  have  made  the  application  able  to  show  user’s  location  to  her 
friends, a new consent with the new purpose would be needed.
Third condition of a valid consent is that it has to be informed. Accord-
ing to the WP29 Opinion12 it means that the consenting data subject must 
appreciate and understand the facts and implication of her action.  There 
should be quite a high standard for the data controller when it comes to in-
forming the data subject. “The more complex data processing is, the more can be  
expected from the data controller. The more difficult it becomes for an average cit-
izen to oversee and understand all the elements of the data processing, the larger  
the efforts should become for the data controller to demonstrate that consent was  
obtained based on specific,  understandable information.”13 This condition is  as 
important as it is problematic. In the Internet era it is very hard for a data  
subject to comprehend possible outcomes of consenting to the processing. It 
11 Ibid., p. 17.
12 Ibid., p. 19.
13 Ibid., p. 21.
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is  almost impossible to foresee future impacts of current privacy decisions 
and therefore it is questionable whether the data subject can really be in-
formed. This problem is also discussed more in the third chapter.
The last condition of a valid consent is that it must be unambiguous. The 
Data protection directive does not prescribe a certain form in which the con-
sent must be made. It can be any action of the data subject, by which she in-
dicates that she consents with the data processing. However, there must be 
“no doubt as to the data subject’s intention to deliver consent.”14 This is a reason, 
why there might be a problem with the validity of the passive, silent, con-
sent, even though this possibility is not forbidden by Data protection direct-
ive. An example of the silent consent can be notice like “By using our site 
you consent to processing of your personal data.” Lack of action might not 
be sufficient as an expression of the data subject’s consent and in the case of 
a conflict the data controller would have to stop the processing.
The four above analysed conditions are necessary for the consent to be 
valid. However with the condition of freely given consent comes hand in 
hand the withdrawal of the consent. As the data subject consents freely, so 
should she have an opportunity to withdraw the consent any time as easily, 
as it was given. Even though the option to withdraw the consent is not ex-
pressly written in the Data protection directive, it cannot be interpreted in 
such a way, that the data subject is not allowed to do so, as proposed by 
Curren and Kaye.15 At least in continental Europe it is not possible to inter-
pret it this way.16 As WP29 claims, “In principle, consent can be considered to be  
deficient if no effective withdrawal is permitted.”17 A withdrawal of the consent 
can be done also through a termination of a user account, uninstallation of a 
game or other way of ending the usage of a service. The consent to personal 
data processing is a part of broader informational self-determination prin-
ciple and as such everyone should have a free will to decide what others 
can do with her personal information.18
14 Ibid., p. 21.
15 Curren, L. & Kaye J. 2010, ' Revoking consent: A ‘blind spot’ in data protection law?', Com-
puter law & Security review, vol. 26, no. 3, pp. 273-283.
16 Curren and Kaye restrict application of their claims for the British law area. 
17 WP29 Opinion No. 15/2011 on the definition of consent, from 13 th July 2011. 01197/11/EN. 
WP187. P. 13.
18 See Ibid., p. 32.
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2.2 SITUATION IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC
Since the data protection law in the Czech Republic is harmonised with the 
law of European Union, the legal situation is quite similar. The constitution-
al base for data protection is anchored in the articles 7 and 10 of the Charter 
of fundamental rights and freedoms.19 General privacy protection is a part 
of the Civil code20 in sections 84 – 90. Consent is used here as a primary way 
of legalising the interference into the protected right for privacy. Withdraw-
al of the consent is guaranteed and is permit even in the case when the con-
sent is given for limited time.21 Data Protection Act22, a key statute of per-
sonal data protection, regulates the matter of consent very similarly to the 
Data protection directive. Finally, opinions of the Czech Office for personal 
protection are also consistent with the opinion of WP29.
The comparison of Czech and European legal framework is much more 
interesting in the case of cookies and similar  technologies.  This matter is 
governed by the Electronic communications act,23 which, as it is stated in its 
section 87(2), is in the field of data protection lex specialis to the Personal 
data protection act  and should therefore be interpreted accordingly.  Art. 
5(3) of the Directive 2002/58/EC is transposed in the section 89(3) of the Elec-
tronic communications act. Interestingly, although other parts of Directive 
2009/136/EC amendment found their way into Czech legal order, the part 
which regulates conditions for use of cookies and similar technologies re-
mained unchanged, matching the original wording of Art. 5(3). Current leg-
al framework of cookies and similar technologies is therefore still set to the 
opt-out principle. To make things even more confusing, the legislator stated 
in the explanatory report of the amendment, that from now on cookies and 
similar  technologies  are governed by the opt-in  principle.  However,  this 
statement has no backing in the positive law. As o result of this situation 
web masters and other data controllers are confused about how they should 
set their services. A possible way out of this problem might be consenting 
via the Internet browser setting. This option, which is expressly recognised 
in the recital 66 of Directive 2009/136/EC, however encounters two prob-
19 Resolution No. 2/1993 Coll., on the declaration of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and 
Freedoms as a part of the constitutional order of the Czech Republic.
20 Act No. 89/2012 Coll., Civil Code.
21 Ibid., section 87.
22 Act No. 101/2000 Coll., on the Protection of Personal Data.
23 Act No. 127/2005 Coll., on the electronic communications.
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lems. As WP29 states in the Opinion on Online Behavioural Advertising,24 
first problem is that since the browser setting is done before data subject re-
ceives the information about processing, it would be very difficult to meet 
the condition of specific  consent. Second problem is that in order for the 
browser setting consent to be valid, the user would have to alter the factory 
setting of the browser at least once and thus express his intention to con-
sent.
3. CONSENT IN REAL LIFE
As we can see, the definition of consent provides quite a strong impression, 
that  consent  to  personal  data  processing  is  a  solid,  well-oiled  machine, 
which works almost without any flaws and provides a data subject with a 
possibility to effectively manage her privacy. The truth is that there is one 
major problem. That problem lies in human nature and capability to com-
prehend. In his article25 Daniel J. Solove recognises several partial problems 
which he divided into two categories – Cognitive problems, connected with 
the data subject, and Structural problems, connected more with the use of 
consent itself. 
3.1 COGNITIVE PROBLEMS
Solove26 compares the situation of a data subject to position of the protagon-
ist from Franz Kafka’s novel “Before the law”. The problem with informing 
data subject is that people do not read privacy policies. If they read them, 
they do not understand them and even if they read them and understand 
them, they often lack background knowledge to realise what policies mean 
and what are implications of consent. Therefore people cannot make an in-
formed choice. Finally, in case that people read policies, understand them 
and realise their implications,  the decision might be deflected by various 
psychological factors.
The first three obstacles make together what Solove calls “The problem of  
the Uniformed Individual”27. Even though data controllers spend recourses on 
the creation of privacy notices, privacy policies and other documents offer-
24 WP29  Opinion  No.  2/2010  on  online  behavioural  advertising,  from  22nd June  2010. 
00909/10/EN. WP 171. p. 14.
25 Solove, D. L. 2013, 'Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemmas', Harvard Law Re-
view, vol. 126, no. 7, pp. 1880-1903. Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract_id=2171018 [cited 15th Jan. 2014].
26 Ibid., p. 1888.
27 Ibid., p. 1883.
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ing the data subject information about the processing,  practically no one 
really reads them. There might be several reasons for this, e.g. the data pro-
tection policies are long, often complicated and there is way too many of 
them hence the data subject needs a lot of time to read them. According to 
Frederik  Zuiderveen Borgesius28,  an average American  would spend 244 
hours a year reading privacy policies of the webpages she visits and there-
fore time invested in the reading of privacy policies can be seen as transac-
tion cost. It is a cost which data subject pays by her time and since, as will  
be discussed later, she does not really see an equivalent value in the reading 
it, she often decide not to do so. Assumption that people regularly read pri-
vacy policies is incorrect.
In order to be sufficiently informative, the privacy policies are not only 
long; they are often too complicated and difficult to read as well. Borgesius 
claims29 that a research showed that more than a half of privacy policies in-
volved in the survey were too difficult for a majority of American internet 
users and that more than 25% of Europeans also find privacy policies also 
too onerous.
Finally, people often lack the necessary knowledge to make a proper in-
formed decision. As Chris Hoofnagle et al. found out in their research, 75% 
of 974 participants of the survey answered correctly 2 or less out of 5 basic 
questions  concerning  online  privacy  knowledge.30 Even if  people  under-
stood privacy policies, without a proper knowledge, without capability to 
see the big picture what implications might the processing have, it is im-
possible to decide correctly whether to allow it or not. 
The fourth obstacle Solove calls “The Problem of Skewed Decisionmak-
ing”31, which is connected with factors that Borgesius calls from the behavi-
oural economics point  of view “biases”32.  First of them is Myopia,  a bias 
which means that people favour immediate benefit over possible future in-
convenience.  Surprisingly  this  is  in  a  contradiction  to,  what  people  say 
28 Borgesius, F. Z. 2013, 'Consent to behavioural targeting in European Law: 
What  are  the  policy  implications  of  insights  from  behavioural 
economics?', (June 7, 2013). Available at http://www.ivir.nl/staff/borgesi-
us.html [cited 13th Jan. 2014]. P. 32.
29 Ibid.
30 Hoofnagle, Ch. J. et al. How Different Are Young Adults from Older Adults When It Comes  
to Information Privacy Attitudes & Policies? (April 14, 2010). Available at http://papers.ss-
rn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1589864 [cited 13th Jan. 2014]. P. 19.
31 Solove, op. cit., p. 1886.
32 Borgesius, op. cit., p. 38.
78 Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology [Vol. 8:1
about how much they value their privacy. Even though people claim that 
they would not change privacy for a small benefit, the bias is stronger. This 
is  also connected with overconfidence and optimism about the future as 
well as with the underestimation of future risk. Solove33 points out an inter-
esting observation that people consider familiar dangers riskier than those 
with which they do not have as much experience. Since for many the pri-
vacy harm is  very hard to imagine,  people tend to underestimate it  and 
therefore are more willing to give away their data.
The four above mentioned problems are sufficient to question, whether a 
person is capable of giving an informed consent. If we insisted on the inter-
pretation of WP29 presented in the second chapter, that informed consent 
means that “consenting subject must appreciate and understand the facts and im-
plication of her action”, suddenly the question could be, whether the consent 
can ever be valid.  Clearly there are huge differences  between paper and 
breathing version of a data subject.
3.2 STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS
According to Solove34, when a hypothetical super-data subject success-
fully passes all four cognitive problems, there still are three more structural 
ones. First of them is “The Problem of Scale”, which is connected with the 
first cognitive problem, and says that there are just way too many data con-
trollers, by which the data subject should exercise her rights. It is impossible 
for a human being to micro manage dozens of different accounts and web 
pages.
The second structural problem is “The problem of Aggregation”  35. The 
nature of personal data is that its effects aggregate. The more data is at one 
place, the more it can say about the data subject. It is impossible to remem-
ber, track or imagine all possible connections of data and information given 
away on different occasions.  Then one day, suddenly data can click into 
each other and reveal facts that the data subject did not want to reveal. And 
since the Internet does not forget, the time between data disclosures can be 
a long one. This represents a trouble for the data controller as well, because 
it might happen, that two or more “normal personal data” create together a 
“sensitive personal data”, which the controller is not entitled to process.
33 Solove, op. cit., p. 1887.
34 Ibid., p. 1888.
35 Ibid., p. 1889.
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The third and last Solove’s structural problem is “The Problem of As-
sessing Harm”. It means that people generally underestimate consequences 
which the data disclosure might have in the future. Since it is closely con-
nected with the last cognitive problem I will  not elaborate on it here any 
further.
It is true, that these three aspects constitute a problem for data subject to 
properly execute privacy self-management. However their effect multiplies 
when consent to processing is regularly used by data controller in a wrong 
manner. And that brings us to the next section. 
3.3 CONSENT FETISHISM
Problems mentioned in previous two sections have one common denomin-
ator.  It  is  a  wrong  way  of  how  the  legal  institute  of  consent  is  used. 
Nowadays from actions  of  both legislator  and data  controllers  it  almost 
seems as if everyone was fascinated by consent, every processing had to be 
legitimised via consent and there was a shared believe in a supernatural 
power of consent, which could be used as an universal cure for both data 
subject and data controller. As was proven in previous sections, this is not 
true. I think that an appropriate description of this behaviour is “consent 
fetishism”.
Demonstration of this wrong approach is when a controller asks for data 
subject’s consent even though it has other lawful possibilities of legitimising 
the processing36. What many seem to forget is that  consent is just a one of 
grounds for lawfulness of data processing. As WP29 states in the opinion on 
consent, it is crucial to use consent in the right context.37 If the consent is 
used in an ill measure, it cannot serve its purpose, which is to let the data 
subject decide how she deals with her personal data. It is confusing for the 
data subject when controller asks for consent although there are other pos-
sible grounds for legitimisation of the processing, e.g. performance of a con-
tract or compliance with a legal obligation, available. When asked for con-
sent subject has an impression, that she can freely control her data. How-
36 The situation of a scientific conference might serve as an example. The participants of the 
conference had to consent with data processing for the sake of a report for a National Fund, 
because the conference was supported by the Fund. In this case the data controller (organ-
iser of the conference) had a legal obligation to disclose list of participants in order to obtain  
the support and therefore the correct legal ground for processing was not necessarily con-
sent, but compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller was subject.
37 WP29 Opinion No. 15/2011 on the definition of consent, from 13 th July 2011. 01197/11/EN. 
WP187. P. 10.
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ever, that is not true, since should the data subject withdraw the consent, 
the processing would still continue, just with a different legal ground. Fur-
thermore,  massive  usage of  consent  overloads  the  data  subject  with  un-
avoidable consent related decisions and readings, which is a major cause of 
problems described in previous sections of this paper.
As can be observed from the legal regulation of cookies and similar tech-
nologies, and its shift from opt-out to opt-in principle, new legislation also 
puts more and more weight on consent. It might seem that the new opt-in 
version offers better protection for the users, but in the end it devaluates the 
institute of consent. And as seen from the WP29 documentation concerning 
cookies38 and from the proposal of Data protection regulation39, the future 
development does not seem to take a more consent-sensitive turn.
4. A LIGHT AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL
There is  a  way out of  this  situation,  or at  least  out of consent fetishism, 
which might provide a good ground for future development of a better pri-
vacy self-management.  The data controllers  should realise  that  there  are 
other legal grounds for processing and use consent only in the case that oth-
er possibilities are not applicable. For a vast majority of daily life situations 
the consent is not necessary, since the processing is either for the perform-
ance of a contract to which the data subject is party, or for compliance with 
a legal obligation. For example, when a data subject wants to use a map and 
navigation service in a mobile phone, the controller does not need to ask for 
consent to process geo localisation data, since these are needed to carry out 
the requested service.
The  granularity  of  services  and consent  is  very  helpful.40 Granularity 
means a possibility for the data subject to decide which parts of the service 
she wants to use, and what personal data she wants to disclose. This prin-
ciple can work even when different legal bases for processing are involved. 
If we use the example from the previous paragraph, navigation is a basic 
function of a mapping service, which is requested by the user and therefore 
the consent is not applicable. However, the new version of the application 
38 See WP29 Working Document 02/2013 providing guidance on obtaining consent for cook-
ies. 1676/13/EN. WP 208.
39 The Proposal of the Regulation states that the consent must be “explicit”. See Art. 4(8) of the 
Proposal for a General Data Protection Regulation, from January 25, 2012. COM(2012) 11 fi-
nal. 2012/0011 (COD).
40 See  WP29  Opinion  No.  15/2011  on  the  definition  of  consent,  from  13th July  2011. 
01197/11/EN. WP187. P. 17.
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offers some value added service, like schedule and reviews of local theatres 
based on user’s preferences, or tracking of movement of the user and post-
ing it on-line. Processing for purposes of these functions would have to be 
based on consent. The user can decide which functions she wants to use and 
disclose her data according to her wishes.
It is important to remind, that even in the case of processing based on 
other legal grounds than consent, the controller still has a duty to inform the 
subject about the processing, so the subject is aware of its existence, pur-
poses and other important information.41 Now, it may seem as if nothing 
would change compared to the current state, since there would be the same 
amount of documents to read. That might be true, but if consent was used 
properly and therefore it was more uncommon, the difference between con-
senting and acknowledging might become evident. If consent was scarcer, 
users  might  be  more sensitive  when the  controller  asks  for  it,  and they 
would be more likely to read privacy policy to find out, why is it necessary 
to consent in this particular case.
5. CONCLUSION
Answer to the question from the title of this paper is “Consent is none of 
those two things”, which can hardly be considered as a surprise. Consent to 
personal data processing is a just a legal instrument and its quality depends 
on  the  manner  how  it  is  used.  In  my opinion,  the  way  how is  it  used 
nowadays is far from perfect. But there is a number of ways how to make it 
work better. For instance a more thorough education of data subjects in the 
field of personal data protection would be very helpful.  Then they could 
better understand privacy policies of data controllers.42 Another option is to 
change the way how data policies are written, so they would be more un-
derstandable. As we know from Creative Commons a system of graphical 
symbols43 might help. However the cost here is a loss of complexity of in-
formation, which is  needed to properly inform the data subject.  Further-
more as claim Myška et al.,44 simplification of legal language, which an in-
troduction of graphical symbols undoubtedly is, can lead to an increase of 
41 Art. 10 of Directive 95/46/EC, on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing 
of personal data.
42 See Solove, op. cit., p. 1886.
43 See Borgesius, op. cit., p. 49.
44 Myška M. et at. 2012, 'Creative Commons and Grand Challenge to Make Legal Language 
Simple', AICOL Workshops 2011, Berlin, Heidelberg, p. 276. Available at http://link.spring-
er.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-35731-2_19 [cited 15th Jan. 2014].
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legal uncertainty. An interesting option comes from authors who argue that 
an automated consent through privacy agents45 can solve the privacy self-
management problems. 
These solutions were out of scope of this paper. My goal was to show the 
current situation and try to offer at least a partial solution that would be dir-
ectly applicable without any legislative needs.
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